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ABSTRACTS

The court's denial of relief was based primarily on Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Youngers interpretation of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The broad language of
Dombrowski indicated that a federal court could consider the constitutionality of a state statute or regulation and issue an injunction
against its enforcement if the statute was so overbroad that it had a
chilling effect on first amendment rights. Younger limited Dombrowski to cases in which irreparable injury could be shown, holding that
"the possible unconstitutionality of a statute 'on its face" does not in
itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it,
and that appellee [must show] bad faith, harassment, or any other
unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief." 401 U.S.
at 54. In Woodruff, no allegations of good or bad-faith enforcement
or circumstances constituting irreparable harm were made and the
court dismissed the case. The court acknowledged that the Younger
abstention standard is usually applied in the context of attack on
state criminal statutes, but held Woodruff indistinguishable for this
reason, noting that state interest in forestalling reasonably anticipated
campus violence created a stronger case for federal abstention. The
court also noted that the plaintiffs in Woodruff apparently had
searched the Student Code for provisions that could be used in the
future to inhibit first amendment rights. The court cited Boyle v.
Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971), which held that this type of conduct
amounts to "nothing more than speculation about the future." 401
U.S. at 81.
Therefore, the court in Woodruff did not decide the constitutionality of the Student Code, but merely affirmed the Younger
criteria for invoking federal equitable jurisdiction.

Employer and Employee-Employer's Action for
Loss of Services of Employee
Plaintiff corporation alleged negligence on the part of defendants resulting in permanent injury to one of its employees, Claire
Lauria. Lauria, an executive employee, received severe injuries when
the auto in which she was a passenger collided with a tractor trailer
owned by defendants. Plaintiff contended such negligence deprived
it of services of the employee, and demanded a one million dollar
judgment for monetary losses. Defendants filed motions for judg-
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ment on the pleadings, claiming there was a failure to state a cause
of action. The trial court sustained the motion and plaintiff appealed.
Held, judgment affirmed. An employer may not recover damages
from a tort-feasor for loss of services of an employee caused by mere
negligence. An employee can only maintain such an action when it
is shown the injuries were intentionally inflicted. Nemo Foundations,
Inc. v. New River Co., 181 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1971).
The court noted that recovery by the master for injury to the
servant, the husband for loss of a wife, and the father for loss of
service of a child are all the results of a particular social status involved. The employer-employee relationship, based on contract, has
no such special relationship; thus the ordinary rules of tort law apply.
The damages to the employer are too remote and indirect for plaintiff to prove the necessary element of proximate cause. As to the
element of foreseeability, the court held the tort-feasor could not
foresee injury to the employer as a consequence of his negligence.
For the above reasons, the court agreed that recovery may be had
only when the injury is intentionally calculated to harm the employee.
Crab OrchardImprovement Co. v. Chesapeake and 0. Ry., 115 F.2d
277 (4th Cir. 1940). It is generally agreed that one party to a contract should not be allowed to recover from a tort-feasor for negligent injuries inflicted on the other party to the contract. Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 153 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1946).
Plaintiff relied on Coal Land Development Co. v. Chidester, 86
W. Va. 561, 103 S.E. 923 (1920), which held that an employer
could recover damages for wrongful injuries to his servant resulting
in loss of services to the employer. In Chidester, however, the injury
was the result of an intentional assault and battery occuring during
the employee's course of employment. The consequences of the act
to the employer could easily be foreseen, and thus the cases are distinguishable. The court expressly disapproved language in the Chidester case and held the tort-feasor, under the facts in Nemo Foundations, Inc., owed no legal duty to the employer.

Evidence-Breathalyser Test-Proper Foundation
for Admissibility into Evidence
The defendant was arrested by -a municipal police officer for
the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. A state police officer administered a Breathalyzer

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol74/iss4/16

2

